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Abstract 
 
The rising number of referendums on EU matters, such as the Brexit and the Catalonian 
independence votes, highlight the increasing importance of referendums as a problem-solving 
mechanism in the EU. We argue that the Swiss case provides essential insights into understanding 
the dynamics behind referendums, which are often lacking when referendums are called for in the 
EU. Referendums in EU member states on EU matters differ substantially from the in Swiss context. 
Nevertheless, proponents of more direct democratic decision-making regularly cite the Swiss 
example. Our systematic analysis of why referendums are called, how they unfold and their resulting 
effects in the EU and Switzerland reveals that the EU polity lacks the crucial conditions that embed 
direct democracy within the wider political and institutional system. The comparative perspective 
offers fundamental insights into the pre-conditions required for direct democracy to function and its 
limitations in the EU.  
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1 Introduction 
This symposium explores the problem-solving capacities of multilevel systems (Ege 2019; 
Tosun, de Francesco et al. 2019; Trein, Thomann et al. 2019). One aspect of this question is 
the long-standing problem of the European Union’s (EU) alleged democratic deficit. An 
intensely discussed potential cure in political and academic circles is direct democratic 
policymaking in the form of referendums as national votes (“EU referendums”) or as future 
EU-wide votes (Hobolt 2006, 2009; Mendez, Mendez et al. 2014). Direct democracy is 
popular among citizens across Europe: a vast majority thinks that referendums are 
important for democracy (European Social Survey Round 6, 2012). Schuck and de Vreese 
(2015: 159) state that “in general, citizens in Western representative democracies are 
supportive of referendums as a supplement to a system in which representatives are 
elected”. However, the Brexit referendum in particular raises concerns about the procedural 
weaknesses of EU referendums. The Brexit referendum represents an extreme case of EU 
referendum use with respect to expected and actual problem-solving capacity. First, 
whereas previous EU referendums in other member states treated questions of accession or 
the EU’s institutional development, the Brexit referendum was the first to ask for a reversal 
of EU integration. Second, unlike any other EU referendum, the Brexit referendum was 
branded as a “once in a lifetime” decision-making moment.  
Despite these unique features, the example begs our central question: can EU referendums 
improve the democratic quality of the problem-solving process? We explore this question by 
comparing EU referendums with the institutional framework and practices of direct 
democracy in Switzerland. The Swiss case offers a useful reference point because especially 
practitioners often consider it as a role model for direct democracy in the EU (Kriesi 2005; 
Vatter, Rousselot et al. 2018). In addition, Freitag and Rapp (2013: 440) quote the late Stein 
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Rokkan that “anyone wishing to study the dynamics of European politics should immerse 
him or herself in the study of Switzerland” as a “microcosm of Europe”. We consider 
Switzerland a good venue to discuss the problem-solving capacity of referendums in the EU: 
first, due to Switzerland’s highly decentralized federalist system that grants similar 
autonomy to member states as the EU’s multilevel governance structure; second, due to its 
cultural, linguistic, religious and regional diversity. 
We define EU referendums as instances of procedural problem solving, as introduced by 
Maggetti and Trein (this volume). Referendums represent decisions on specific problems. 
The decision maker is the people, and they collectively produce the decision via the vote. In 
the EU, referendums often simultaneously address both technical policy-related problems 
and wider problems of legitimizing the EU (cf. Papadopoulos 2005). Just as in other political 
systems, referendums may also serve more and different purposes beyond mere policy 
decisions. The comparative perspective that we adopt contrasts the problem-solving 
capacity of the EU referendums with Swiss referendums. Thereby, we aim to generate 
relevant knowledge for administrative and political practitioners who seek to solve the EU’s 
democracy challenges through direct democracy.  
We argue that to understand the merits and challenges of direct democracy in the EU, we 
must consider the specific institutional contexts in which referendums operate. Two 
institutional differences between EU referendums and referendums in Switzerland stand out 
when comparing their institutional contexts and the resulting varying effects on actor 
motivations and voting outcomes. The first obvious difference is that referendums in the EU 
take place at the lower system level, that is, in a single member state, even though the 
decisions will often have EU-wide implications. Except for referendums regarding a state’s 
EU membership, all other EU referendums result in the democratic problem that a minority 
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of citizens in one state can produce outcomes that affect all EU citizens (Auer 2004). Second, 
in contrast to referendums in Switzerland, EU referendums are not embedded in the EU’s 
representative democratic processes—and often also not in those of the member state. We 
argue that due to these specificities, EU referendums cannot unfold the same role in 
problem-solving and integration as Swiss referendums. Instead, the decisively different 
institutional contexts imply that EU referendums complicate, rather than facilitate, problem-
solving by further polarizing and politicizing decision-making. As a result, voters are driven 
by the politics dimension, such as ideological beliefs and conflicts, rather than considerations 
about the policy issues at hand. The EU’s institutional context is not able to accommodate 
the possible adverse policy consequences of popular decisions in the same way the Swiss 
polity does. Hence, while politicization can render policy decisions more democratically 
legitimate, the institutional context appears to be counterproductive in the EU.  
Our argument builds on existing research that emphasizes the need to analyze EU 
referendums in light of “theoretical and empirical work on referendums in national domestic 
contexts” (Hug 2002: 4; see also Schneider and Weitsman 1996) and pledges to consider 
individual behavioral patterns and comparative institutional aspects (Hug and Sciarini 2000). 
In this vein, our contribution is twofold. First, while earlier studies predominantly limit their 
analyses to single-case referendums, we use a comparative perspective and contrast the EU 
and Swiss cases at the system level. This allows us to go beyond single cases and to 
investigate the conditions under which referendums can unfold a problem-solving capacity. 
Second, we extend the perspective of previous research to include the recent round of 
referendums that took place in a more EU-skeptic environment. This demonstrates that 
even though we observe an increase in populist politics in both the EU and Switzerland, the 
problem-solving and polarizing effects of referendums differ substantively. Due to 
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fundamental differences in their institutional and administrative conditions, it is ill founded 
to reference Swiss direct democracy when calling for more referendums in the EU. The 
comparison reveals that the conditions under which referendums operate in multilevel 
systems determine the consequences that referendums trigger for policies, politics, and the 
polities. Our goal is to put the quickly growing research agenda on EU referendums back on 
track at this moment of rising demands for more citizen participation.  
2 Institutional Embeddedness of Referendums as Defining Feature 
This section offers a brief simplified sketch of the institutional embeddedness of 
referendums and their related dynamics in Switzerland and the EU. While the wider political 
system embeds referendums in Switzerland into “regular” policymaking, political 
representation, and governance institutions, these linkages are absent in the EU. 
Additionally, Swiss referendums serve as an important trigger for cooperative and 
consensual decision-making that integrates different interests. It is this integrative 
momentum that proponents of EU referendums aim to achieve. However, referendums play 
a very different role in the two political systems.  
Switzerland is one of only a few countries that regularly applies direct democratic 
instruments . Referendums form an integral part of the political-institutional system. At the 
national level, Swiss citizens are normally asked to the ballot four times a year on very 
different policy and constitutional issues. However, unlike the popular understanding of 
Swiss direct democracy as “rule by the voice of the people”, Switzerland is a semi-direct 
democratic system founded on a clear division of labor. Most decisions ultimately depend on 
three interacting institutions: the people as the sovereign, the parliament as the law-making 
body, and the government as the executive. The sovereign has the final say in the most 
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important decisions, namely changes to the constitution. The parliament decides on laws for 
matters deemed important. The government has authority at the level of ordinances (Sager, 
Ingold et al. 2017; Linder 2012). Hence, direct democracy is an element of the Swiss 
consensus democracy and is strongly embedded in the checks and balances of (pre-
)parliamentary and governmental processes, as well as regional implementation procedures 
(Vatter, Rousselot et al. 2018). The Swiss administration plays a central role in buffering the 
ramifications of direct democratic votes, especially during policy implementation.  
In contrast, EU referendums remain fully detached from other democratic legitimization 
mechanisms at the EU-level. Current EU treaties do not offer a basis for uniform EU-wide 
referendums. EU issues can therefore only be subject to national referendums. This means 
that it is predominantly only national actors who communicate and campaign in a limited 
state-context. The state-specific democratic purposes for holding a referendum vary widely. 
While the Irish constitutional court established a mandatory referendum on all EU-decisions 
that would change the Irish constitution, referendums on EU matters remain optional in the 
other member states, or are even prohibited, as in the case of Germany. The vast majority of 
EU referendums are therefore mere plebiscites that the political leadership of a state 
summons voluntarily in a top-down manner (Vatter 2000), or, in rare cases, through citizen 
initiatives. The function of EU referendums, as a strategic instrument that belongs to 
national political elites, contrasts with the Swiss system. In Switzerland, either the 
constitution prescribes referendums or they are bottom-up affairs initiated by popular 
initiatives or facultative referendums.  
This lack of institutional embeddedness of EU referendums has far-reaching consequences. 
First, EU referendums are actually national referendums on EU-related issues. This is similar 
to the United States of America (US) where referendums are also only possible at the state 
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level. In the US system, people can only vote on state matters (e.g. state legislation on 
marijuana, minimum wage, gun laws, or health care). Conversely, EU-referendums affect 
supranational issues. This means that the electorate of one EU state can produce outcomes 
that may impact on the citizens of all EU member states, even those not involved in the vote 
(Auer 2004: 580). EU referendums thus fundamentally contradict the democratic principle 
that all affected parties should participate in a decision (Dahl 1970: 64; Goodin 2007). 
Second, EU referendums in member states often lack consistent linkages to the standard 
representative political process. Given that political communication and legitimization 
remains predominantly national, the EU lacks an overarching political discourse between all 
affected parties. Moreover, as implementation lies in the hands of the national public 
administration of each member state, which implies an even greater “nationalization” of 
referendums, despite their EU-wide effects. 
In sum, whereas the Swiss case is commonly often cited as a role model for the use of direct 
democratic instruments, this attribution neglects the crucial institutional embeddedness of 
these instruments and their related dynamics. Accordingly, EU referendums may produce 
substantially different effects than those observable in Switzerland. The next sections 
elaborate on how the initiation of referendums and voting behavior differ in the two cases 
and how this affects the potential of referendums as a remedy to the democratic deficit.1 
                                                 
1 We argue that these differences in the institutional embeddedness are crucial for evaluating and discussing 
the potential effects of referendums. Conversely, we do not differentiate between different types of 
referendums, e.g., whether the referendum initiated is top-down or bottom-up, whether it is binding or not, 
etc. (e.g. Vatter 2000, 2014). Different types of referendums exist in EU member states and in Switzerland. 
However, we do not seek to analyze or to recommend a specific type of referendum. Instead, we concentrate 
on the more fundamental question of how referendums interact with the representative democratic system at 
the system level,.  
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3 Intended and Unintended Effects of Referendums  
EU research offers various explanations for political elites – mostly voluntary and top-down 
– decision to conduct EU referendums (for an overview see Hobolt 2006: 157).2 Overall, “the 
pattern of referendums on EU treaties is explained by a combination of domestic-level 
political factors – electoral pressure over European integration, legal obligations to hold 
referendums and domestic institutional veto players – and differences between EU treaties” 
(Prosser 2014: 15; also Oppermann 2013b; Trechsel 2010). Furthermore, research shows 
diffusion of referendum practices and domino effects across states (Jahn and Storsved 1995) 
and few patterns of path dependency (Wimmel 2014). Interestingly, the literature provides 
the same explanations regarding governments’ reasons for not holding EU referendums 
(Closa 2007: 1327). Preempting referendums became an overreaching governmental 
objective after the negative referendum outcomes on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 
(Oppermann 2013a). Even though these studies come to overlapping conclusions, they 
neither provide a consistent explanation for why states use referendums, nor for the 
policymaking implications of these referendums. Juxtaposing EU-focused research with 
insights into the motives behind and the implications of referendums in the Swiss case 
reveals significant mechanisms that contextualize the findings on the EU.  
 
Motivations Driving the Call for Referendums—Intended Effects  
EU research remains inconclusive on the motives behind holding a referendum. Conversely, 
                                                 
2 With regard to citizens’ support of EU-related referendums, research contrasts the cognitive mobilization of 
political dissatisfaction in the EU (Schuck and de Vreese 2015) with voters’ dissatisfaction with the performance 
of respective government (Rose and Borza 2013).  
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research on Swiss direct democracy more systematically demonstrates that different actors 
invoke referendums for very different purposes, with actual policy decision only being one of 
them (e.g. Linder 2010, 2012; Vatter 2014). First, referendums can induce a direct effect 
(Linder 2010: pp. 103). Direct effects include the introduction of a new law or policy in the 
case of a yes-vote. However, they may also include the stabilization of the status quo if a 
proposal is rejected (Stadelmann-Steffen 2011; Tsebelis 1999). Second, popular votes, 
especially those stemming from the bottom-up, can also invoke more implicit, indirect 
effects, like placing new issues on the political agenda or broadening what was perceived as 
politically imaginable (Linder 2012: pp. 288). Third, direct democratic instruments can serve 
as an electoral campaign element. By proposing a popular initiative or calling for a 
referendum, a party can distinguish itself and its positions from other parties and/or attract 
(media) attention (Linder 2012: 289).  
This plurality of motivations for holding referendums raises questions about the hidden 
motives of actors in EU member states (on the constitutional treaty see e.g. Crum 2007). 
Insights into Swiss motivation patterns behind holding referendums should prevent 
researchers from wrongly assuming that EU political elites solely invoke referendums for EU-
generic reasons. Instead, researchers should consider that multiple direct and indirect 
motivations are at work when political elites call for EU referendums (see also Morel 2001 
for similar arguments regarding consolidated democracies more generally; Rahat 2009). In 
EU countries, regular representative policymaking processes can be employed fruitfully for 
direct effects. In contrast, referendums initiated by political elites are more likely to serve, at 
least implicitly, an electoral campaign purpose. The decisive difference between Swiss and 
EU referendums is that political elites who initiate EU referendums compete in closed 
national electoral campaigns but not EU-wide ones. Similarly, while EU political elites may 
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intentionally seek to create the indirect effects of placing new issues on the political agenda 
or broadening what was perceived as politically imaginable, the practical/actual effects 
resulting from referendums are likely to have a different outcome than in Switzerland 
because of the difference in system level (national versus EU-wide). 
 
Direct Democracy as a Legitimacy-enhancing Mechanism – Unintended and Intended Effects 
It is commonly expected that referendums quasi automatically increase legitimacy, by 
enhancing the acceptance of the polity through the procedural inclusion of citizens in 
decision-making, and by enhancing the acceptance of concrete policy decisions that citizens 
help to co-determine. These two expectations are based on two assumptions about direct 
democracy. The first assumption is that policy outcomes in a direct-democratic setting are 
closer to the median voter’s preferences (see also Stutzer and Frey 2010) and hence increase 
policy congruence between the political elite and citizens, particularly when their 
preferences deviate (Leemann and Wasserfallen 2016). The second assumption is that direct 
citizen participation promotes the perception of procedural fairness (Stutzer and Frey 2010; 
Dorn, Fischer et al. 2008), ergo the mere possibility to directly participate makes outcomes 
more acceptable (Bellamy 2018). However, empirical research on more long-standing direct 
democracies challenges these automatic positive effects (  hlmann and Sager       
Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter 2012; Trechsel 2010). Moreover, several studies emphasize 
that direct democracy effects do not materialize in a vacuum but are contingent on and 
interact with elements of representative democracy, e.g., the role of parties and the political 
elite (Fatke 2014; Trechsel and Sciarini 1998) or participation and elections (Peters 2016; 
Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010). This latter argument also demonstrates that direct 
democracy is not, in reality, something opposed to or separated from representative 
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democracy. Instead, direct democracy operates within representative democratic systems, 
meaning that its consequences depend on the characteristics of the representative 
democracy.  
The Swiss case reveals that direct democratic processes in themselves are not what establish 
the success of the Swiss half-direct democracy. Instead, what matters is the balance 
between the direct representation of the people and the representation of federal elements 
(the cantons). Since 1874, ballot decisions on all popular initiatives must receive the majority 
of popular votes and a majority in at least half of the cantons (Vatter 2014: 403 following). 
More generally, direct democracy is tightly linked with a consensual decision-making 
process. This “special conflict resolution model” serves to avoid “the threat of a referendum 
that hangs like the sword of Damocles over every decision-making process” (Varone 2007: 
298; Sager and Zollinger 2011) and helps to integrate a variety of actors and interests into 
the decision-making process. In addition, a direct-democratic decision is never the final 
policymaking step in Switzerland. Various actors at different steps of the policymaking 
process represent politicized interests in policy decisions – beyond the “tyranny of the 
majority” that characterizes popular votes (Vatter 2000).  
At the Swiss federal level, the federal political-administrative nexus transforms the 
constitutional changes demanded by successful popular initiatives into implementable law 
(Vatter, Rousselot et al. 2018). Moreover, Swiss cantons enjoy major organizational and 
substantial discretion when implementing centrally-decided policy decisions (Thomann and 
Sager 2018). Indeed, while cantonal interests play a minor role in the policymaking process 
at the federal level, they are crucial for the implementation of decisions (Vatter, Rousselot et 
al. 2018). Difficult decisions can thus be adjusted to political realities during implementation. 
In essence, in the Swiss case, direct democratic instruments link to other mechanisms in the 
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political system in order to provide the opportunity to correct for decisions that cannot be 
implemented and to adjust them to political reality. As Vatter et al. highlight, “the process of 
policy change does not simply ‘end’ with (…) voter approval of a referendum or initiative. (…) 
If popular decisions are not or only partially implemented, policy change due to direct 
democracy occurs far less often than research hitherto suggested. As a side-effect, 
implementation deficits potentially also have an impact both on citizen attitudes towards 
democracy and on (future) voting behavior” (Vatter, Rousselot et al. 2018: 8-9).  
In the EU, referendums typically occur in the different institutional and politico-cultural 
contexts of a single member state. Referendums are therefore not embedded in the larger 
EU polity, even if they focus on EU-matters and are likely to have EU-wide implications. In 
addition, as member states initiate the referendums, they also have to directly respond their 
outcomes and lack instruments to correct, pre-empt or revise decisions. In consequence, 
despite the overall similarities that drive EU-Swiss comparisons, regarding the legitimacy-
enhancing effect of direct democracy the US case offers a more suited comparative case. In 
contrast to Switzerland, but similar to the EU, in the US direct democracy only occurs at the 
state level. Studies show that direct democratic rights in the US have not led to power-
sharing (Gross and Kaufmann 2003: 3). Direct democracy actually “gets around” the 
legislature. By building a parallel, independent way of policymaking, direct democracy may 
thereby exacerbate the problems of representation that are inherent to majoritarian 
democracies. Bowler et al. (2007) find that citizens in the US are much less supportive of 
direct democratic instruments than in Switzerland.  
Given that there is a similarly lacking systemic embeddedness of referendums in the overall 
EU polity, this contrasting effect in the US is likely to reflect mechanisms that are also at 
work in the EU. The fact that EU referendums are rare events in many countries amplifies 
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the de-legitimizing effect. These studies thus offer strong indications that EU referendums 
are much more likely to produce the adverse effects that occur in the US, rather than the 
more desirable effects as in Switzerland. Prime Minister Cameron exemplified this when he 
branded the  rexit vote as a “once in a lifetime” experience. This exceptionality, which 
separates popular votes from standard representative democratic mechanisms, may hinder 
a legitimacy-enhancing effect. Citizens lack the experience of becoming informed and 
deciding on referendum decisions, and as a result, there is a high uncertainty about what the 
government will do with the result. This exceptionality also renders citizens’ perceptions of 
the positive legitimacy-enhancing effect of direct democracy less likely.  
Our analysis also suggests that the specific nature of EU referendums affect voter behavior. 
This conclusion leads us to next section on how EU referendum research can benefit from 
Swiss-centered research on voting behavior in referendums. 
4 Voting in Referendums  
How does the use of direct-democratic decision-making affect the outcomes of political 
processes? As the Brexit-vote highlights, highly polarized referendums limit the validity of 
prediction models (Qvortrup 2016; Vasilopoulou 2016; but also Glencross 2015). Given the 
uncertainty of referendum outcomes, policymakers may wish to increase their predictability 
in order to anticipate citizens’ decisions. 
In order to provide a background for understanding and predicting referendum outcomes, 
we summarize the main explanations posited in the literature on EU referendums. While the 
literature on the role of information, campaigning and deliberation suggests that voting 
outcomes are essentially determined by the issue positions of the electorate (issue-voting 
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perspective) (Hobolt and Brouard 2011; de Vreese 2007), comparative EU research on the 
Maastricht referendums challenged this view in the early 1990s (Franklin, Marsh et al. 1994; 
Franklin, van der Eijk et al. 1995). These studies “spurred a still-ongoing debate between two 
competing approaches to voting behaviour in EU referendums: the ‘attitude’ school and the 
‘second-order election’ school” (Hobolt 2006: 154-55; see controversy between Franklin 
2002; and Svensson 2002). The second-order explanation holds that EU referendums decide 
on national matters and are thus a plebiscite on the performance of national governments, 
with potential effects on states’ EU bargaining power (Hodson and Maher 2014; also Hobolt 
2006: 160).  
Empirically, most studies support the issue-voting perspective (Garry, Marsh et al. 2005), i.e., 
that “how voters understood the EU polity, in particular whether membership is beneficial 
to one’s own country, was a crucial factor in all the referendums” (Glencross and Trechsel 
2011: 755; similar findings focusing on campaigns and discourse Seidendorf 2010; de Vreese 
and Boomgaarden 2005). In addition, strategic behavior of governing and opposition parties 
(Crum 2007), party cues combined with issues (Marsh 2015), and emotional voting (Garry 
2014) explain referendum outcomes. Finally, the combined effects of socio-economic 
reasons, Eurosceptic sentiments and the role of political and governmental elites have 
moved to the forefront of the academic debate (Startin and Krouwel 2013; Font 2008 
similarily stressing the pro/contra position of governmental elites). 
We argue that research on direct democratic votes more generally can provide the EU 
literature with more “traditional” approaches that help to better explain and empirically 
examine citizens’ vote decisions in referendums, and thus referendum outcomes (Hug 2002). 
For example, as in EU research, Swiss research on direct democratic votes focuses on the 
role of campaigns and issues (Sciarini and Tresch 2011; Steenbergen 2010; Selb, Kriesi et al. 
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2009; Brady and Johnston 2006; Marquis 2006; Lachat and Sciarini 2002; Lachat 2000). 
These studies reveal more ambivalent and nuanced results than most EU research. While 
campaigns may matter in some contexts and for some groups of voters, party affiliation 
outweighs campaign effects in many situations (Sciarini and Tresch 2011). Voters may rely 
on heuristics when confronted with complex questions, (Milic, Rousselot et al. 2014: 24 
following). Kriesi (2005: 138) identifies three heuristics. First, the status quo heuristic, 
whereby citizens vote “no” and prefer the known status quo to an unclear future. Second, 
according to the trust heuristic citizens decide in accordance with the government. Third, 
according to the “quintessential” shortcut or the partisan heuristic, citizens follow the 
recommendation of the party to which she/he feels closest. This research offers analytical 
categories for the contingency of campaign effects and highlights interaction effects with 
party positions; issues that are thus far understudied in EU referendum research. By 
unveiling the complexity behind voters’ decisions, this research suggests a high likelihood 
that direct-democracy may produce unintended (political) outcomes. 
The Brexit decision has fueled concerns about another crucial issue in referendum voting, 
namely the role of informed and uninformed decision-making. Recent research on citizens’ 
decision-making takes up this issue for direct democratic campaigns (Colombo 2016; 
Colombo and Kriesi 2017) and regarding the use of scientific evidence as political argument 
in direct-democratic campaigns (Schlaufer 2016; Stucki 2016a). Stucki (2016a) shows that 
the use of evidence in referendums can increase the focus of campaigns on policy solutions, 
while counteracting normative considerations and arguments about politics. Moreover, 
Schlaufer (2016) demonstrates that using evidence fosters the deliberative quality of 
campaigns. Direct-democratic campaigns can also serve as an entry point for evidence-based 
arguments, if the experts take an active role in the respective debates (Stucki 2016b). 
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Similarly, scholars repeatedly argue that particularly in the US context voters associate direct 
democratic processes with greater political information, knowledge, and voter interest 
(Donovan, Tolbert et al. 2009; Smith and Tolbert 2004). However, these studies also reveal 
that the overall share of evidence-based arguments in referendum campaigns is extremely 
low (Schlaufer, Stucki et al. 2018) and that the share of voters who are actually able to justify 
their decision is small (Colombo 2016). Moreover, this share does not dramatically increase 
when governments provide information. It is not possible to ignore tendencies of motivated 
reasoning (Taber and Lodge 2006) and biased information processing (Colombo and Kriesi 
2017). These dynamics may be particularly relevant in politicized, once in a lifetime 
referendums, as EU referendums often are.  
In addition to evidence, pre-polls play an important role in shaping discourses and 
expectations prior to a vote. Analyzing public opinion in direct-democratic debates through a 
more methodological perspective offers valuable insights into the challenges and potential 
strategies that increase the predictability of referendum outcomes. Predicting public opinion 
and referendum outcomes is a challenging and error-prone task. The Brexit vote is the most 
recent and prominent illustration: public opinion polls predicted a tight race with the 
remain-side in front. Similarly, pre-poll surveys came under fire in Switzerland after the vote 
on the initiative “against the construction of minarets” in     . Despite pre-poll predictions, 
57.5 percent of the voters and a clear majority of the cantons accepted the proposal on the 
ballot. These two examples raise serious questions about the methodological accuracy and 
reliability of pre-polls.  
In the context of Swiss direct democracy, researchers have recently proposed several 
solutions for handling these challenges and for improving the quality of the analyses and 
their interpretations. Based on an analysis of 184 Swiss referendums between 1987 and 
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2007, Funk (2016) concludes that “surveys are inaccurate for topics on international 
integration, immigration, gender equality, and votes involving a liberal attitude” (ibid.: 449; 
see also Morris 2011; Powell 2013) since individuals do not reveal their actual preferences 
for politically incorrect views in surveys. Sciarini and Goldberg (2016) show that the biased 
composition of the survey sample is an important source of biased survey results. However, 
this is not easy to correct because of well-known demographic and socio-economic 
stratifications. In this vein, Leemann and Wasserfallen (2016) develop novel weighting 
procedures that reveal valid predictions of voting outcomes based on non-representative 
samples. Moreover, experimental approaches promise more valid insights into public 
opinion. Researchers apply choice experiments to consider the different trade-offs that are 
inherent in many ballot proposals (Häusermann, Kurer et al. 2016; Stadelmann-Steffen and 
Dermont 2018). Providing survey respondents with the specific proposal on the ballot and 
with randomly varied alternatives allows analytically to identify the crucial aspects or 
arguments that determine voter behavior. These approaches may eventually help to 
mediate the social desirability bias (Hainmueller, Hopkins et al. 2014: 3), which scholars 
generally consider to be of particular relevance in EU referendums.  
These methodological issues of pre-poll surveys and their analysis is more than just a 
scientific discussion. Given the high visibility of pre-polls in today’s media environment, their 
potential influence on the campaign and eventually even on voting behaviour, improving the 
quality of pre-polls is relevant for the quality of the democratic process. Hence, we argue 
that these methodological insights and experiences should be considered when polling 
before and after EU referendums. Due to the high levels of polarization and the 
exceptionality of referendums, polls on EU referendums may be particularly error-prone. 
Additionally, a better understanding of how campaigns in EU referendums “work” is crucial 
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from a practitioner’s point of view. For policymakers, these insights can help to organize and 
steer campaigns in a way that increases citizens’ level of information about both the issue at 
stake and the direct-democratic decision process. Eventually, this would increase the 
democratic quality of the voting process and its outcomes.  
5 The Impacts of Referendums – Implications for Policy, Politics, 
and Polity 
We conclude by scrutinizing the more general impacts of referendums on the policies that 
are put to the vote, on politics and on the polity in general. Reviewing these three spheres 
directs our attention to the core link between direct and representative democracy in a 
more generalized way. Table 1 summarizes our main conclusions regarding scope conditions 
for the problem-solving capacity of referendums in the EU and Swiss contexts (Trein, 
Thomann et al. 2019). It is important to note that in the empirical “reality” systems may 
combine conducive as well as hindering conditions. For example, one could question 
whether in Switzerland the debate and campaign is of high quality. Moreover, the country is 
not immune against unintended effects of direct democratic decisions, and there have been 
ballot decisions that rested on ideological divides rather than on the issue at such. Thus, 
whereas Switzerland serves as an illustrative example for advantageous conditions in which 
problem-solving capacity through direct democracy might be given, day-to-day practice do 
not always meet these ideal conditions.  
 
Table 1 about here 
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Despite these inevitable “real-life” limitations that remain a significant feature of direct 
democracy in practice, the table reveals more systematic differences between the two 
situations. The two dimensions of the formal institutional set-up and informal practices stick 
out as most significant for referendums to unfold a legitimacy-enhancing effect. Based on 
this summary, we can draw further conclusions on how referendums affects the policies, 
politics and overall polities under specific scope conditions. 
First, referendums clearly impact policies. Referendums are an instrument of opposition held 
by the sovereign, which limits the influence of the legislature and the executive. Since 
referendums require organizational, financial, and political resources, this instrument is not 
as easily available to anybody as it seems. Instead, well-organized groups, such as vested 
interests, parties, and businesses have an advantage. This access bias influences the 
selection of policy issues that surface in referendums. In addition, in a semi-direct-
democratic system such as Switzerland, the democratic checks and balances imply a status 
quo bias toward existing policies. The effect is very similar to what Hacker and Pierson 
(2014) describe as “policy as prize”: interest groups are much more interested in the long-
term returns of policy decisions than in the political influence gained through representation 
in legislative and executive processes.  
Direct democracy must thus not be confused with democratic politics. Instead, direct 
democracy must be understood as a form of governance that is prone to the same 
limitations of a purely electoral democracy, as Orren and Skowronek (2017) criticize in their 
book, The Policy State. Representative systems are less volatile than election promises are, 
and policy change is much harder to achieve than new majorities in the executive tend to 
suggest. In the policy state, rather than acting as a means of translating the pure popular will 
into politically binding decisions, referendums reveal the influence of policy-specific 
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interests in a transparent way. This perspective explains how referendums can be 
understood as a feature of the “policy state”. For referendum votes to really focus on the 
policy content, a complex set of institutional and motivational pre-conditions need to be 
met. The national votes on EU-wide concerns in the EU are particularly ill-equipped to meet 
these conditions.  
Second, in addition to being policy-decisions, referendums heavily impact politics. Direct 
democracy typically evokes the expectation that the political process and its outcome will 
have greater quality, legitimacy and acceptance. However, the legitimacy-enhancing effects 
of direct democracy only materialize under specific circumstances. Our findings hint at a 
dilemma that has significant implications for EU referendums. In contrast to Switzerland, 
which is often referred to as a role model that benefits from the positive impacts of direct 
democracy, EU referendums lack institutional embeddedness at the EU-level. Additionally, 
and especially if they are one-shot events, they also lack linkages with the state-level 
(representative) political system. This disconnect increases the uncertainty regarding the 
outcome and consequences of these votes. It also renders the EU context fundamentally 
different from the Swiss context and much more similar to the US example of restricted 
state-level referendums. As such a context decreases alignment effects and increases the 
overall politicization of the polity as such, it undermines the legitimacy of decision-making 
rather than enhancing it.  
We therefore conclude that EU referendums are unlikely to have legitimacy-enhancing 
effects. EU referendums produce politics rather than more legitimate policy-decisions. As 
such, they are likely to enhance the polarization and the politicization of support for the EU 
– at the expense of the issue-focused purpose of referendums.3 In contrast, in Swiss 
                                                 
3 This contrasts Papadopoulos’ (2005) conclusion that EU-wide referendums could be modeled on the Swiss 
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consensual decision-making, double majority requirements and extensive implementation 
processes generally buffer this effect. However, and in an interesting parallel to EU member 
states, we observe that in Switzerland certain EU-related votes are also increasingly 
politicized and polarized, in particular by right-wing populist parties that mobilize voters 
based on anti-EU and anti-migration sentiments.  
The dialectic of EU referendums is that while they ought to improve the democratic quality 
of EU decision-making, they actually may have the opposite effect. This is true of both 
national referendums on EU matters and hypothetical EU-wide referendums. Both forms of 
EU referendums (at the national or the EU-level) lack the institutional and administrative 
embeddedness that link direct and representative decision-making. Even though 
referendums may be embedded in a purely national context,4 national referendum decisions 
can only be attained at the expense of a EU-wide legitimizing and/or a EU-wide problem-
solving effect because the scope and effect of decisions would otherwise remain purely 
national. If embedded and institutionalized in national standard procedures, EU related 
referendums could enhance the democratic legitimacy of EU-related decisions in a 
respective state – but the effect would be limited to the context in which the referendums 
are embedded and would not necessarily apply to the entire EU. 
 Moreover, direct democratic instruments may raise the question of who the constitutionally 
designated sovereign is and who decides on the (dis)integration of the multilevel system 
(Bellamy 2018). In the national context, this has become apparent in the legal quarrel on 
                                                                                                                                                        
example in order to increase their political legitimacy and accountability. 
4 Ireland does have institutionalized mandatory national referendums. Nevertheless, we argue that while this 
institutionalized process may have a legitimizing effect at the national level, it still lacks institutional 
embeddedness at the EU-level. 
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whether the Brexit referendum is binding without a vote in Parliament. We repeatedly 
observe similar bewilderment when rejected ballot proposals are recast into a second 
referendum, as with the Dutch referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty, or the Irish 
Maastricht and Amsterdam referendums. This implies that under the EU’s current 
institutional context, practitioners who want to enhance the EU’s legitimacy should not 
invoke national referendums or strive for EU-wide referendums without a full-fledged 
institutional reform that ensures that referendums are embedded into EU-representative 
democratic procedures. Short of this, both EU-wide and national EU referendums are likely 
to undermine, rather than to promote, the intended democracy-enhancing effect. For the 
EU, in which implementation is a member state responsibility, this option simply does not 
exist across 28 states.   
Finally, referendums can impact polity. Explicit constituent referendums play a fundamental 
role in EU research, especially since the 2005 referendums on the Constitutional Treaty, 
which marked a major break in EU integration (Dehousse 2006: 301) and a substantial shift 
in EU politicization (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Even when seemingly non-constituent issues 
are put to a popular vote, they almost inevitably affect the polity dimension when they 
involve a shift of sovereignty from the national level to the EU-level or vice-versa. The 
Hungarian referendum on EU migration policy is a clear illustration of this. In asking voters if 
they supported “the European Union to be able to mandate the resettlement of non-
Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of the National Assembly” 
(October 2, 2016), the referendum fundamentally broke with EU treaties that deem majority 
decisions in the EU Council to be binding for all member states. In fact, in the Swiss context, 
direct democratic decisions that go against international treaties and obligations are also 
repeatedly put on the political agenda. The dilemma lies in the presence of several and 
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contradictory democratic decisions that often have a constitutional or internationally 
binding character. The Swiss case aptly demonstrates the difficulty of designing stringent 
rules of the game that deal with such contradictions – even in a context in which direct 
democracy is a fundamental element of the political system and culture. In these situations, 
the ultimate decision is often left to judges or protracted during implementation. While this 
can be seen as one form of procedural problem-solving in a direct democratic context, it 
may not appeal to traditional notions of democratic legitimacy. 
To conclude, this contribution demonstrates that scholars and practitioners must neither 
scientifically nor politically consider direct democracy as a simple fix for democratic deficits. 
Direct democracy not only entails far-reaching consequences beyond actual policy decisions. 
The direct-democratic integration of citizens into the decision-making process also involves 
trade-offs, including the possibility of decisions that contradict existing institutions. 
Additionally, direct democracy itself is also generally prone to populism. We highlight 
conditions that make direct democratic instruments work. Direct democracy is not just an 
add-on to parliamentary democracy. To enhance democratic legitimacy, it needs to be 
carefully crafted as part of representative democracies. While this is an important insight for 
political actors eager to call for more direct democracy, it is equally relevant for researchers. 
Only by considering the contextual dependencies and trade-offs caused by EU referendums 
and by testing expectations and approaches in different direct-democratic contexts can we 
improve our knowledge on how direct democracy actually works in the EU – and beyond.  
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Table 1: Problem-solving capacity of referendums in Switzerland and in the EU 
 
 Scope conditions 
Contextual feature Conducive for problem-solving Hindering for problem-solving 
Formal set-up 
 
Intertwined with representative 
democratic system 
 
Lack of institutional embeddedness both 
at EU and national level  
 
 Consensual democracy 
 
Adversarial multilevel system 
 Congruence of voting entity and 
affected entity  
Incongruence of voting and affected 
entity  
Informal practice 
 
Regular use, strong notion of bottom-up 
corrective (with pre-emptive function) 
 
Mostly ad-hoc political top-down use by 
national political elite 
Strong variance across member states 
 
 Comparatively strong focus on evidence 
and policy issues during campaigns  
 
Debates in nationally segmented public 
spheres 
Comparatively low use of evidence and 
high politicization of campaigns  
Effect on problem-
solving  
 
Safeguards and prevents unintended 
effects 
 
Strengthens issue-voting 
 
 Legitimacy-enhancing 
 
 
Prone to producing unintended effects 
and tension between EU issues and 
Member state issues 
Strengthens politicization 
 
 Legitimacy-undermining 
Illustrative case 
 
Switzerland 
 
European Union 
Source: own compilation.  
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